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Meeting the Carnegie Report’s 
Challenge to Make Legal Analysis 
Explicit—Subsidiary Skills to 
the IRAC Framework
Nelson P. Miller and Bradley J. Charles
No one asked how subject matter was transformed from the 
knowledge of the teacher into the content of instruction.1
I. Accepting the Challenge
This article accepts the now-common assertion, recently repeated in the 
Carnegie Foundation report Educating Lawyers, that law professors should make 
explicit the analytical skills their students must learn.2 Although the traditional 
view has been that teaching critical thinking is straightforward, more recently it 
has been suggested that the traditional view is seriously misleading.3 Cognitive 
psychology has taught us that the best students and, for that matter, the best 
1. Lee S. Shulman, Those Who Understand: Knowledge Growth in Teaching, 15(2) 
Educational Researcher 4–14 (1986).
2. William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch Wegner, Lloyd Bond & Lee S. Shulman, 
Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law 11 (Jossey-Bass 2007) (legal 
analysis should “be made visible” so students can “be coached toward performing as 
professionals”); id. at 26 (law instruction should “mak[e] explicit important features of good 
performance through various conceptual models and representations").
3. Richard W. Paul, Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly 
Changing World 376 (Found. for Critical Thinking, 3rd ed. 1993) (contrasting the traditional 
view represented by Bloom’s Taxonomy with more recent studies showing the complexity 
of critical thinking); see also Paul Maharg, Transforming Legal Education: Learning and 
Teaching Law in the Early Twenty-First Century 5 (Ashgate 2007) (criticizing the uni-modal 
educational practices of traditional law schools).
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experts, are those who master the subsidiary skills of analysis.4 The traditional 
view holds that students are expected to acquire analytical skills by immersion, 
which can mean sink-or-swim. Students do learn that way, although not as 
quickly or efficiently as they could if what they were learning—rules of law—and 
how it was derived—legal analysis—was made clearer to them.5 Thus, law schools 
must make plain how and what it is that students are required to learn.6
The IRAC framework is the generally accepted way of representing legal 
analysis. It begins by identifying the issue and the applicable rule, then matches 
facts to the law in an analysis or application, and then reaches a conclusion—together, 
Issue, Rule, Analysis, and Conclusion, or IRAC. This article recognizes 
the value of the IRAC framework and assumes that students should use it. 
This article adds to the discussion of IRAC by identifying and illustrating 
many of the subsidiary skills that students must acquire to effectively use the 
oversimplified IRAC framework.7 IRAC’s subsidiary skills will help them 
become self-learning, competent lawyers and citizens for life.
Most law schools teach the IRAC method in the first term of law school. 
The first term is the best time to start, as studies show that early mastery of 
learning (early in a course, early in a curriculum, early in a career) tends to 
provide greater (and perhaps exponential) benefit.8 So the first term is also the 
best time to teach IRAC’s subsidiary skills.
Law professors play a key role in teaching the subsidiary skills. They, who 
intuitively perform these subsidiary skills, have the responsibility to better 
understand the workings of their craft and to explicitly teach those workings.9 
That means that law professors must think in greater detail about what it is 
that effective, skilled, and ethical lawyers are doing when performing legal 
analysis.10
4. Paul, supra note 3, at 378 (“students (and experts) who do the best analyses, syntheses, and 
evaluations tend to do them mindfully with a clear sense of their component elements”); 
see also Robert H. Ennis, Conflicting Views on Teaching Critical Reasoning, in Critical 
Reasoning in Contemporary Culture 11, 19 (Richard A. Talaska, ed., SUNY Press 1992).
5. See, even as to grade schools, Ruby Payne, Understanding Learning: The How, the Why, the 
What 24, 76 (Aha! Press 2002) (schools should “direct-teach the process”).
6. Sullivan et al., supra note 2, at 89 (“faculty attention to the overall purposes and effects 
of a school’s educational efforts is surprisingly rare”); Michael Josephson, Learning & 
Evaluation in Law School 69 (AALS 1984) (law professors should recognize the wide range 
of intellectual skills involved in understanding).
7. See John Dewey, How We Think 55 (D.C. Heath & Co. 1933) (analysis is actually a myriad of 
skills).
8. See Maharg, supra note 3, at 246.
9. Sullivan et al., supra note 2, at 32 (“effective pedagogy” “must be a highly self-conscious, 
reflective one”); Paul, supra note 3, at 376 (“teachers need a solid foundation in critical 
thinking skills before they can teach them”).
10. See Richard Skemp, Intelligence, Learning, and Action: A Foundation for Theory and 
Practice in Education 251 (John Wiley & Sons 1979) (teaching at a professional level requires 
having a model for learning).
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This article attempts to illustrate how faculty can teach these skills by briefly 
highlighting the process that leads to the substantive outcome. Highlighting the 
process will teach students to be critical thinkers and self-learners for life. The 
authors suggest that law school faculty read this article with their lesson plans 
close by. Work into the plans a few questions that focus on process, as most of 
the skills covered in this article can be taught that simply. Others might require 
a few minutes of discussion. Faculty should develop and consistently use a 
unique trigger phrase so the students know when instruction is going from a 
focus on substance to a focus on process. Something as simple as “Okay, let’s 
step back for a moment. How did we reach that?” or “What skill led us to that 
conclusion?” will work just fine.
Following this introduction, Part II, on preparatory skills, reminds the 
reader that law students must adjust their thinking and reading when beginning 
their law studies. Part III then identifies and illustrates five conceptual skills 
that students must master to effectively employ the IRAC framework. Part 
IV addresses three logical skills, two of them well known and a third not so. 
Part V addresses six evaluative skills that students must master. And Part VI 
concludes by reminding the reader that the skills must then be re-assembled and 
practiced continuously for many years to claim genuine expertise as a lawyer.11 
Please note that although the article uses tort-law examples throughout, for 
consistency and because one of its authors is a torts professor and practitioner, 
the skills it identifies and illustrates apply to legal analysis in general.
II. Preparatory Skills
A. Thinking
It may seem too obvious to say that thinking is the most basic skill necessary 
to effectively use the IRAC framework. But law students, as much or more 
so than students of other professional studies, must learn to think with an 
energy and consistency that they probably have never before maintained.12 
Mental energy, concentration, memory, organization, and other mental states 
influence student success in law school. Thus, students should learn some of 
the practices that promote effective thinking.13
Leaving room for creativity and variation is a practice that promotes mental 
acuity. Law school is not simply about acquiring a huge mental database. It 
is also about skill in creatively and flexibly using that database in remarkably 
complex ways.14 For example, in tort law, intent is commonly an issue. Studies 
11. See Sullivan et al., supra note 2, at 99 (iteration is necessary to form good clinical habits).
12. See Ruth Ann McKinney, Reading Like a Lawyer: Time-Saving Strategies for Reading Law 
Like an Expert 60 (Carolina Academic Press 2005) (many new law students underestimate 
the physical challenge of law school and run out of energy); id. at 63 (some law students are 
overwhelmed and lose energy).
13. See Dewey, supra note 7, at 3, 4, 9 (advocating the systematic study of analytic thought).
14. Skemp, supra note 10, at 119 (higher-order thinking requires students to make successive 
abstractions at ever higher levels); see also Lee S. Shulman, Signature Pedagogies in the 
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of the brain show that it takes enormous mental activity to judge another 
person’s intent in the context of social relationships and group activities.15 Tort-
law analysis is mentally hard work. It requires a creative, flexible,16 and even 
improvisational form of mental activity. Students must be ready to constantly 
vary their thinking to explore and adapt to new rules, procedures, and facts.
Memory is also critically important to legal analysis. It is not that students 
must have a superior memory, only that they must learn ways to remember. 
Memory actually involves three mental operations—organizing, storing, and 
retrieving. Organizing is often automatic, but many memories like those 
necessary for legal analysis must be organized with effort. The more meaning 
students attach to the organization of a memory, the stronger it will be. 
Memory is stored in two forms, short and long term, using two different parts 
of the brain.17 Students should learn that a good way to increase storage and 
retrieval success is to review new information immediately and later.
Another way to improve thinking is to increase sensory integration, meaning 
to use more of one’s senses as one thinks about law studies. As students read 
using visual sense, they should consider speaking important phrases to activate 
aural and oral senses. As they listen to their professors or classmates, they 
should take notes and draw diagrams to activate kinesthetic and visual senses; 
they should move their hands and change expression and posture as they 
speak. Thinking can improve when senses combine with thoughts. Students 
should also keep in mind that vision has a far more powerful effect on thinking 
than do other senses. A picture is worth a thousand words.
Illustration: After a class discussion that teaches a rule from a case, 
demonstrate how one might easily remember the rule such as by linking the 
key phrase from the rule (“substantial factor”) to a memorably distinct aspect 
of the claim or case (perhaps that the perpetrator was substantial). Then, let 
the students practice after the next case and rule extraction: give the students 
two minutes to organize that rule for quick memory retrieval.
Professions, 134(3) Daedalus 52, 56 (2005) (“Pedagogies that bridge theory and practice are 
never simple. They entail highly complex performances….”); Lee Shulman, The Wisdom 
of Practice: Essays on Teaching, Learning, and Learning to Teach 443 (Jossey-Bass 2004) 
(“The more central a concept, principle, or skill to any discipline or interdiscipline, the more 
likely it is to be irregular, ambiguous, elusive, puzzling, and resistant to simple propositional 
exposition or explanation.”).
15. See generally John Medina, Brain Rules: 12 Principles for Surviving and Thriving at Work, 
Home, and School (Pear Press 2008); see also McKinney, supra note 12, at 64 (maintain 
wellness and relationships).
16. McKinney, supra note 12, at 76–77.
17. Medina, supra note 15.
Meeting the Carnegie Report’s Challenge
196 Journal of Legal Education
B. Reading
There are many ways to read, and some reading strategies hold more value 
for law students. Because law texts are a new genre for many law students, 
they must use a more analytic approach to read these texts productively. 
Analytic reading strategies include readiness, purpose, rereading, anchoring, 
evaluating, and hypothesizing. Students who use these and other analytic 
strategies have been shown in limited studies to outperform students who use 
only linear reading strategies like highlighting, paraphrasing, noting detail, 
and making margin notes.18 How does this analytic reading strategy relate 
to the IRAC framework? First, students must read to know the rule—the R 
of IRAC. Second, reading will help the student develop legal application 
skills—the A of IRAC. And, lastly, students will gain practice with IRAC and 
its subsidiary skills every time they read a case because each case follows the 
IRAC format.
In general, to read law well students must learn to consistently step beyond 
the text.19 Expert law readers consistently question the legal text.20 For 
example, with the help of law professors, syllabi, casebook tables of contents, 
and introductory notes, students should first discern why they are reading the 
text. What specific topic does the reading address under the studied subject? 
It then helps to place that topic within the larger context that students have 
already learned or are learning.21 Where, in other words, does the reading 
fit? Then, as the student reads, the student should be raising and attempting to 
answer questions about the text, while recognizing that answers should remain 
tentative subject to additional reading and classroom discussion.22
Consider the specific example of reading a case. Law students typically 
receive valuable23 and much needed24 training in how to brief or outline cases.25 
18. See Leah M. Christensen, The Paradox of Legal Expertise: A Study of Experts and 
Novices Reading the Law, 2008 BYU Educ. & L.J 53, 57–59 (citing Mary A. Lundeberg, 
Metacognitive Aspects of Reading Comprehension: Studying Understanding in Legal Case 
Analysis, 22 Reading Res. Q. 407, 407 (1987)); Laurel Currie Oates, Beating the Odds: 
Reading Strategies of Law Students Admitted Through Alternative Admissions Programs, 
83 Iowa L. Rev. 139, 139-140 (1997).
19. Peter Dewitz, Legal Education: A Problem of Learning from Text, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 225, 229 (1997).
20. Id. at 231–232; McKinney, supra note 12, at 153.
21. Dewitz, supra note 19, at 237–238.
22. Id. at 233.
23. See Leah M. Christensen, The Psychology Behind Case Briefing: A Powerful Cognitive 
Schema, 29 Campbell L.Rev. 5 (2006) (stating the cognitive benefits to case briefing); id. at 
23–24 (instruction in improved case briefing).
24. See Charles R. Calleros, Legal Method and Writing 16 (Aspen Pubs. 2002) (cases can mystify 
beginning law students who lack the requisite conceptual schema); James A. Holland & 
Julian S. Webb, Learning Legal Rules: A Student’s Guide to Legal Method and Reasoning 
126 (Blackstone Press Ltd. 1993).
25. See Holland & Webb, supra note 24, at 66–67.
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A case presents a story in which a balance in relationships has been disturbed.26 
Although a case has a story, lawyers do not read for plot, characters, theme, or 
literary technique, as students may have been taught to read or may prefer to 
read.27 A lawyer questions the case’s text to identify the narrow issue, separate 
relevant from irrelevant facts, recognize the parties’ strategies, identify the rule 
or holding, separate out dicta, determine how sound the case is as authority, 
and identify and evaluate the holding’s rationale. After that critical analysis, 
the lawyer then applies the rule or holding to other, current cases.
To implement this strategy for cases, law professors can teach the following 
three-step structure as a reading guide. First, students should put the case in 
its context before beginning to read. Doing so focuses attention by giving 
purpose to their reading. The purpose is usually explicitly stated in the course 
syllabus and professor’s objective, and in chapter and subchapter headings. 
Students should look for connections between the subject and the case. 
They should then examine the case title and citation, asking if the parties 
are individuals or corporations, checking whether it is state or federal court, 
and asking if it is a trial, mid-level appellate, or supreme court. They should 
consider whether it is a recent (untested but current) or old (tested but dated) 
opinion, and ask if the case might represent peculiar social or political times 
or geographic concerns.
Illustration: A professor can help students develop this skill by asking before 
a case is briefed in class, “What’s the legal context of this case?” Perhaps a 
follow-up question could be “How do you know that?” The professor could 
point out that the chapter and section or sub-section heading is a hint at the 
legal context.
Second, after context is established, a case is then read for overview, to 
develop a framework or schema.28 Students should be alert to the opinion’s 
general structure, looking for a procedural summary at the start, then a 
statement of the issue or dispute.29 They should know why the opinion is 
necessary—the legal grounds it addresses. They must grasp the fact setting, 
knowing in particular what happened to whom and for what reason.30 They 
should be able to picture the event. Often lawyers will look for the conclusion—
the court’s holding—early on, before the facts, rule, or analysis is even read. 
Having that conclusion in mind early on allows the reader to better evaluate 
the court’s discussion. Students should then identify the rule and authority 
26. See Sullivan et al., supra note 2, at 43 (legal analysis “follows a standard plot” of a stable state 
disrupted in a manner that the lawyer must precisely define through artificial reasoning 
to obtain an authoritative holding that produces a return to the original equilibrium or 
produces new relationships consistent with the principles to which the law is tied).
27. See Bruce K. Britton & Arthur C. Graesser, Models of Understanding Text 12-13 (Lawrence 
Erlbaum Assocs. 1996).
28. McKinney, supra note 12, at 17, 19 (case briefing is a kind of schema).
29. See id. at 19–22 (describing the structure of a case opinion).
30. See Dewitz, supra note 19, at 231 (experts read case facts twice as slow as non-experts).
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for the rule, whether it is constitutional, statutory, regulatory, or common 
law. Finally, the reader should look for the meat and potatoes of the case—the 
analysis, rationale, or reasoning for the court’s decision.
Illustration: The first week of class, the professor can point out how a case’s 
structure basically follows the IRAC framework. This will reinforce in the 
students that there is a basic yet flexible framework to legal analysis.
As part of the second step, students may then reread the case analytically, 
encoding their learning. In doing so, they must distinguish relevant from 
irrelevant facts and notice qualifying terms and phrases like “if,” “when,” and 
“only.” The heart of the matter is for the student to identify how the court has 
analyzed the facts to fit the rule. How does it define central terms and phrases 
using context? Students should test the case’s rationale. Does the case apply 
controlling or advisory authority, or sound or disputed authority? Were the 
statements of law necessary to the case’s outcome? If not, that statement of law 
is merely dictum, not a holding. Was the authority properly applied or should 
it have been distinguished? Students should ask if the rationale involved a 
policy decision; if so, was the policy sound, meaning justified by the asserted 
interest, empirically provable or true, and fair, equitable, proportional, fitting, 
or moral?31 Students might ask if it is a judgment courts (rather than legislatures) 
should make and, ultimately, decide whether they agree or disagree with the 
case’s holding and outcome, articulating their reasons why or why not.
Illustration: Sometimes, students’ case briefs are longer than the actual case. 
When this occurs, the skill of selecting relevant information needs honing. A 
professor could start a brief discussion on this skill by asking, “How do you 
spot irrelevant stuff?” Then the professor could point out that information is 
irrelevant if it is not directly or inferentially related to the court’s holding and 
reasoning.
Third, after reading a case, students should decide how the case fits into 
their learning. They should synthesize the case with other rules and cases, 
asking how it modifies or adds to their knowledge. They should fit the holding 
into a diagram, mnemonic, or outline. They might ask how the case reflects 
the accepted law or whether it illustrates the rule or an exception to the rule. 
They might also ask whether it represents a majority or minority rule, and 
whether it is a recent extension or confirmation of settled law. Students would 
profitably ask why the authors included the case in their casebook out of the 
thousands of published cases. Students might hypothesize other applications 
of the case, write or discuss who they would rather represent and why. Students 
would increase retrieval routes for the knowledge (a key criterion for cognitive 
performance and therefore law-school success) by testing their knowledge of 
the case in this manner.
31. Sullivan et al., supra note 2, at 11–12 (“Because it always involves social relationships with 
consequences, practice ultimately depends on serious engagement with the meaning of the 
activities—in other words, with their moral bearing.”).
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Illustration: To demonstrate this last point, the professor might show the 
students once or twice how to synthesize a rule. Explain that the R of IRAC 
often does not come from one source—whether in law school or practice—and 
then how one rule was created by synthesizing the last several cases that were 
discussed in class.
The foregoing discussion suggests that students learn four sets of skills 
by reading cases, usually in a certain order. First, a single case can be read 
for a determinate (clear) holding. Second, multiple cases can be read for a 
determinate synthesis of a whole legal subject, like all of the elements of a 
certain crime or tort. But a single case can also be read for the indeterminate 
(unclear) issue it leaves unresolved. Finally, multiple cases can also be read for 
indeterminate trends or tendencies of courts in certain situations.
These suggested reading strategies and skills require substantial energy 
and motivation. Generally, reading motivation can be divided into internal 
(intrinsic) motivation and external (extrinsic) motivation. Internal motivation 
includes reading for curiosity, interest, inspiration, knowledge, education, and 
advocacy. External motivation includes reading for grades, passing the bar 
exam, getting a job, or out of fear that the student will be embarrassed when 
called on to recite. Some studies suggest that law students who exhibit greater 
internal motivation generally outperform students who exhibit greater external 
motivation.32 Students may also be more satisfied and less anxious to the extent 
that they are able to identify and rely on internal reading motivation.33
III. Conceptual Skills
A. Conceptualizing
Law practice is intellectual. Lawyers and other experts must become 
masters at conceptualization and re-conceptualization.34 Unless students 
form appropriate concepts through their law studies, they will be unable to 
use IRAC.35 For a student to know a concept means the student can recall it 
from memory, explain it to another, give examples and non-examples of it, 
and recognize when the concept applies to something students will encounter 
in law practice. Students must learn many concepts in their first term. For 
example, in the first week of Torts I, they may learn about “intent,” “harm,” 
“offense,” and “contact,” each of those concepts relating to the tort of “battery,” 
32. Id. at 98–99.
33. Id. at 99.
34. Skemp, supra note 10, at 121 (“Since conceptualization is so central a feature of the learning 
by which we become more expert in [analysis], any progress we can make in identifying the 
factors which affect concept formation will have widespread value for setting up conditions 
favourable to intelligent learning.”).
35. Sullivan et al., supra note 2, at 26 (treat doctrinal instruction as a “cognitive apprenticeship” 
“making explicit important features of good performance through various conceptual 
models and representations”).
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which is itself a concept. Lawyers are expert at legal analysis because of their 
ability to acquire, recall, and use concepts.36
The ability to acquire appropriate concepts depends in part on word 
recognition. Words are symbols that convey meaning. Recalling and using 
the right words, as symbols for larger meanings, is obviously an important 
subsidiary skill to the IRAC method. Students must learn new legal 
terminology. Their studies will benefit if they also acquire the skill of using 
mental images and shorthand symbols to help recall more complex concepts. 
Lawyers are expert at legal analysis in part because of their ability to recall 
and use meaning-laden words. Recall is aided by specific images, words, and 
symbols.
Illustration: Using I for Intent, H for Harm, O for Offense, and C for Contact 
are examples of shorthand symbols for the elements of a tortious battery. A 
professor, no matter what the course, can teach students to use symbols by 
giving a few examples early on in the course.
The ability to acquire and use appropriate concepts requires the construction 
and use of more elaborate schema, a mental structure of connected concepts. 
With a professor’s help, a student will learn to assemble concepts into schema.37 
For example, IHOC is a schema representing the connected concepts for 
the elements of a tortious battery—Intent, Harm or Offense, and Contact. 
Schemas help students recall and use related concepts. Indeed, learning can 
itself be described as the purposeful, goal-directed changes in the organization 
of concepts into schemas,38 just as knowing can be defined as possessing an 
appropriate schema.39 After students begin to recall and use various schemas, 
they will notice that they are gradually expanding and modifying those 
schemas as they add new concepts. Lawyers are expert at legal analysis in part 
because of their ability to organize, recall, and use elaborate schemas.40
36. See Sullivan et al., supra note 2, at 96–97 (“One of the key findings of cognitive research is how 
important conceptual models, or schemas, are in human thinking.”).
37. Skemp, supra note 10, at 24, 113–114, 131; see also Sullivan et al., supra note 2, at 72 (professors 
should give more attention to making explicit the pedagogical scaffolding); see Skemp, supra 
note 10, at 253 (good teaching sees the ability to acquire and modify schemas as the goal of 
learning); Richard E. Mayer & Merlin C. Wittrock, Problem Solving, in Patricia A. Alexander 
& Philip H. Winne, Handbook of Educational Psychology 289 (Lawrence Erlbaum Assocs. 
Pubs. 2nd ed. 2006) (to facilitate meaningful learning and retention, content is explained 
with an emphasis on its structure and connections); Jere Brophy, Observational Research 
on Generic Aspects of Classroom Teaching, in Alexander and Winne, supra, at 775 (teachers 
may help students scaffold and construct frameworks for learning).
38. Skemp, supra note 10, at 71; see also Ralph H. Johnson, Critical Reasoning and Informal Logic, 
in Critical Reasoning supra note 4, at 73 (critical reasoning is disciplined and self-directed, 
relying on criteria, and thus self-correcting and sensitive to context).
39. Skemp, supra note 10, at 167;  Gregory Schraw, Knowledge: Structures and Processes, in 
Alexander and Winne, supra note 37, at 259.
40. See Skemp, supra note 10, at 131–132 (experts constantly activate and adapt latent schemas 
through a selective sensitivity, building new schemas contributing to higher-order models).
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A cognitive map is a mental picture or outline connecting schemas to 
other schemas. Understanding can itself be defined as the appropriate linking of 
concept to schema and schema to other schema.41 With a professor’s help, and 
through activities like review and outlining, a student must gradually develop 
cognitive maps linking schemas to schemas, forming a single integrated body 
of knowledge.42
Illustration: IHOC is a schema for the intentional tort of battery, to which 
a student will link schemas for the other intentional torts of assault, false 
imprisonment, and trespass to land and chattels, because those intentional 
torts share certain characteristics and are often considered together.
Consider a concept—symbol, schema, and cognitive map—that students 
usually learn in the first weeks of the first term of law school. Their Torts I 
studies will help them recognize, explain, and give examples and non-examples 
of “knowledge of substantial certainty of harm.” For convenience’s sake, they 
can label this new concept KSC (Knowledge of Substantial Certainty). They 
will also learn that knowledge of substantial certainty of harm (KSC) is one 
of three ways, along with the desire to harm (DH) and transferred intent (TI), 
to satisfy the intent element of a battery claim. Students can then construct a 
schema for intent (I) out of concepts that include the desire to harm (DH), 
knowledge of substantial certainty of harm (KSC), and transferred intent (TI). 
Students will also learn that a battery claim (B) having the elements of intent 
(I), harm or offense (HO), and victim contact (C), is just one of five traditional 
intentional torts (IT) along with assault (A), false imprisonment (FI), trespass 
to land (TL), and trespass to chattels (TC). These concepts and their schemas, 










41. Skemp, supra note 10, at 148.
42. See Maharg, supra note 3, at 247–248 (students must develop the sense of a subject as a 
“knowledge object” representing a coherent and integrated body of knowledge).
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Illustration: Demonstrating how to create a cognitive map for even one 
subject is all most students need. Professors can then encourage students to 
try it for each subject covered.
Professors should point out that learning law tends to follow steps. The 
student first identifies the schema with which the new learning connects. Then, 
the student properly connects the new learning to the schema, expanding, 
dividing, or adjusting the schema to fit the new learning. Finally, the student 
connects new concepts and schema with earlier schemas. The quality of a 
student’s learning depends on the student’s skill and confidence in selecting 
and organizing concepts and schemas. In other words, while a student is 
learning law, the student is also developing and improving methods of learning 
law.43 After all, lawyers are expert learners.
B. Reasoning
Most law professors would say that reasoning is the A of IRAC—application. 
But, as discussed below, reasoning is also used in forming the rule—the R of 
IRAC. The reasoning skills that follow will assist students in more effectively 
employing the IRAC framework.
Critical reasoning is both a method and an attitude, as well as an ethic.44 
The central aspect of critical reasoning is the commitment and ability to be 
persuaded by reasons rather than by personality, prejudice, power, chance, or 
other factors.
Although it can be used to benefit or destroy, critical reasoning enables 
lawyers to promote order. Our society accepts critical reasoning as an 
appropriate means to resolve disputes and that society will not be stable and 
orderly without a citizenry capable of and committed to being moved by 
reason.
Illustration: After discussing a case with particularly poor reasoning—whether 
fallacious or otherwise—ask, “What would happen if all cases were reasoned 
this way?” After a case with solid reasoning, ask “Although you disagree with 
the outcome, is the holding credible, i.e., based on reasoning you can follow?”
Some people reason effectively. Others do not. Reasoning is a learned skill. 
Because ordinary interaction with others does not always develop reasoning 
43. See Skemp, supra note 10, at 87 (students are continuously meta-learning, meaning that they 
are constantly developing a concept of their own learning that affects the quality of their 
learning); P. Karen Murphy & Lucia Mason, Changing Knowledge and Beliefs, in Alexander 
and Winne, supra note 37, at 314 (students benefit when thinking about conceptions over 
merely thinking with them); Margaret Le Brun & Richard Johnstone, The Quiet Revolution: 
Improving Student Learning in Law 88 (The Law Book Co. 1994) (“we encourage our 
students to improve their abilities to learn, for example, by discovering how they learn and 
then working to expand their approaches to become better learners”).
44. See  Harvey Siegel, Education and the Fostering of Rationality, in Critical Reasoning, supra 
note 4, at 100 (moral reasons support using critical reasoning as an ideal).
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skills, the first year of law school is designed to help students learn to reason in 
the professional context in which lawyers practice.45
Individuals usually think of causes (as in cause-and-effect) and opinions more 
so than reasons. Thoughts are formed and influenced through encounters with 
the environment, meaning through physical events and social interaction.46 
Events and circumstances cause people to decide and act in certain ways. 
Because individuals experience events and hear opinions (even their own) as 
first-hand encounters, they ordinarily think and decide primarily on the basis 
of causal thinking and personal preference or influence. To challenge another’s 
position is sometimes seen as a challenge to the person who presumptively had 
cause to hold that position.47
The critical thinker, however, does not care who made the statement or 
what caused it. Critical reasoning considers a statement’s content rather than its 
cause or author. So a statement is not a personal encounter with its author but 
is an object for evaluation. Critical thinkers then reflect upon the statement in a 
way that enables them to consider grounds or reasons for agreeing or disagreeing 
with the statement. Challenging a statement as unreasoned is not an offense to 
its author, just as justifying a statement is not the author’s endorsement.
Students should notice a fundamental difference between reasoned and 
unreasoned thought. Unreasoned thought treats a statement as if it is within a 
closed system. Within a closed system, you can question what caused or who 
authored a statement, but consideration ends once those facts are resolved. 
Reasoned thought treats statements as if they are within open systems.48 One 
can consider a wider range of alternatives as to the grounds supporting or 
challenging a statement, each of which would differently shape a broader 
variety of possible future events. One can articulate and consider different 
possible goals, purposes, policies, interests, and meanings.49
Consider an example from tort law. Students may read a case in which a 
man who throws a stick to scare a boy away from climbing on his building is 
held liable when, accidentally, the stick injures the eye of another boy who was 
hiding behind the building.
45.  See Maharg, supra note 3, at 221 (professionalism rather than competence is the preferred standard 
for law students).
46. See Parker Palmer, To Know as We Are Known xv (HarperOne 1993) (knowing is a communal 
act).
47. Lenore Langsdorf, The Imperative Focus: A Prerequisite for Critical Reasoning, in Critical 
Reasoning, supra note 4, at 164–165, 173–178.
48. Langsdorf, supra note 47, at 166–168.
49. See Calleros, supra note 24, at 72 (“The usefulness of the syllogism in legal reasoning, however, 
is limited by the flexibility and uncertainty inherent in legal analysis.”); Holland and Webb, 
supra note 24, at 229 (“The role of theoretical logic is thus limited by the fact that it may only 
take the judge so far as identifying a number of rational options.”) (“The idea of public 
policy has always played some part in the legal process.”).
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An uncritical thinker might encounter that case as a personal event, taking 
the side of the man or boy depending on the affinity the thinker has for either 
while regarding the event as an improbable shame. The uncritical thinker 
might be offended by anyone who disagreed because, after all, the thinker felt 
an affinity for either the man or boy. Next time something similar happened, 
the uncritical thinker might regard it as an unconnected event and again 
decide based on his affinity for one side or the other. The uncritical thinker 
would not classify the event with other similar events or generalize rules or 
principles from it.
By contrast, a critical thinker might consider the goal to be accomplished 
by holding the man liable or the fairness of doing so—concluding, for instance, 
that imposing liability would deter others from throwing sticks at children. 
One moved by reason would perhaps consider the degree of responsibility the 
boy should bear, the relative ability of man and boy to avoid harm in similar 
instances, liability’s effect on the man and boy, and similar considerations. 
The critical thinker would also consider and imagine counter-arguments to 
each rationale, until the thinker discerned and was able to support the best 
conclusion.50 The critical thinker would synthesize the case with similar cases 
and would generalize rules and principles from it to guide future decisions 
and actions.
Illustration: A professor can make this point by stating during a heated 
debate that ad hominem comments—or statements that attack character rather 
than evaluate argument—have no place in the law. Also, a professor might 
point out that it is entirely possible that a student’s controversial stance is only 
a pretext to encourage debate.
C. Generalizing
Lawyers encounter law within specific circumstances. A court rule is applied 
in a specific case. A case opinion states a holding on specific facts. A lawyer’s 
client wins or loses on a certain legal count. An insurance company pays or 
refuses to pay a specific claim. Lawyers constantly face not having a reported 
case on precisely the same facts as their clients’ cases. To deal with this, the 
United States’ jurisprudence has built flexibility into stare decisis. Lawyers 
must synthesize rules and holdings to state more general rules of law before 
applying those rules to other specific cases.51 These general rules are created by 
recognizing similarities between case rules, facts, and holdings.52
This skill of generalizing rules is one that students learn mainly by reading 
a series of cases. The untrained person will not readily generalize a broad rule 
from its specific application. A rule can be stated at many different levels, from 
50. See Paul, supra note 3, at 383 (instruction should foster rational habits of thought).
51. See McKinney, supra note 12, at 11 (the essence of being a lawyer is the ability to move from 
the specific to the general and back to the specific).
52. See Geoffrey Samuel, The Foundations of Legal Reasoning 112 (Metro 1994); see also Dewey, 
supra note 7, at 150 (generalizing is important to analysis).
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very narrow to quite broad. For example, a case that many students study in 
the first week of Torts I holds that the contact element of a battery claim is 
satisfied when a waiter grabs a plate from the hand of a diner. That very narrow 
rule of liability for grabbing a plate from someone’s hand would be of little use 
to a lawyer, unless the lawyer had another plate-grabbed-from-the-hand case—
an unlikely scenario. The lawyer’s skill would be to generalize that narrow 
rule to include a liability rule for grabbing anything from another’s hand—not 
just a plate. Indeed, a lawyer might legitimately further generalize that rule 
into an even broader rule of liability for forcefully removing anything closely 
connected to a person’s body, perhaps like a purse or backpack.
Illustration: After a series of hypotheticals, step back and ask the students 
to generalize a rule from those specific hypotheticals. To make that more 
interesting, you could then take that generalized rule and apply it to a final 
hypothetical. This moment would also be a good time to point out that 
generalizing is one way to create the R of IRAC.
Generalizing rules need not be a mystery. Students should notice that in 
many cases it is as simple as substituting a broader class or category of items 
or actions for the specific item or action stated in the original rule. So, for 
instance, the plate in the original rule becomes “any item.” The person’s hand 
in the original rule becomes “closely connected to a person’s body.” And the 
grabbing action in the original rule becomes “forcefully removing.” A lawyer’s 
skill is to generalize narrow rules by, in effect, substituting broad for narrow 
terms.
Students also need to evaluate what is a fair generalization. Not every 
rule can be generalized to include every possible person, action, or item. A 
rule applied to a child, for instance, like the traditional “attractive-nuisance” 
doctrine in tort law, may not be applied to an adult when the rationale for the 
rule involves the inability of a child to appreciate dangers. A proportional-
liability rule applied to a certain drug that causes birth defects may or may not 
be applied to asbestos that causes lung disease. Students must begin learning 
the skill of properly generalizing in law school but can expect to take years to 
master it.
D. Specifying
Given that generalizing rules is a lawyer’s skill, so, too, is specifying them. 
Students must develop the skill of determining whether and how to make a 
rule more specific to a certain situation or application. This skill is not quite 
the same as applying the rule, because in making a rule more specific, a lawyer 
has not yet drawn a conclusion. The lawyer is still simply stating a rule. But it 
is a step closer to applying the rule because the rule is stated in a manner that is 
closer to the situation under consideration. It is the skill of substituting more 
narrow terms for the rule’s broader ones.
Consider again, for example, the broad tort rule mentioned in the prior 
section, that touching anything closely connected with the person satisfies a 
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battery’s contact element. A lawyer might encounter a case in which a client 
had a handbag snatched from her shoulder. In that case, the lawyer might 
readily particularize the broad rule by saying that snatching a handbag from 
one’s shoulder satisfies the contact element. Making the general rule specific in 
that manner would be reasonable because a handbag on the shoulder is closely 
connected with a person’s body. But what if instead of snatching a handbag 
from her shoulder, someone had slammed a fist on the hood of her car while 
she was in it? Particularizing the general rule for that case is more questionable 
because the exterior of a car is not something so obviously closely connected 
with one’s body. It is, nonetheless, a particularization of the rule that a lawyer 
would at least consider and, depending on a variety of other factors (including 
the results of research), perhaps articulate.
For another example, a general tort-law rule provides that one who violates 
a safety statute prohibiting motor-vehicle drivers from exceeding posted 
speed limits is subject to an inference of negligence. Speeding is careless. But 
a student should see that there are several more specific statements, within 
the general scope of the broad statement, that are clearly not valid. A law-
enforcement officer who speeds after a fleeing felon and an ambulance driver 
who speeds to the hospital with a dying patient are not necessarily careless. A 
student must think of the safety statute’s purpose (to keep the general flow of 
traffic to a safe speed) and consider the circumstances (the need to speed to 
save or protect lives) to know whether the specific statement within the general 
rule is valid.
Lawyers constantly exercise this sense of moving from a general statement 
to a more specific one while carefully considering whether it is valid to make 
the statement more specific. Just because one has a relevant general rule does 
not mean that it always applies. Just because a general statement is valid does 
not mean that a more specific statement within the scope of that general 
statement is also valid. It might be, and so a student must think about it. But 
it is the skill of a lawyer to know whether a general statement can be made 
specific and whether it applies.
E. Hypothesizing
Lawyers are, in a sense, excellent dreamers. They can quickly think up 
hypothetical facts, scenarios, and situations—a highly useful skill or knack that 
aids the analogical reasoning lawyers often employ. Creative hypothesizing 
can lead to discovering unknown facts. A lawyer’s ability to hypothesize 
possible or probable facts can be a key skill for investigating and developing 
a case theory. And then again, often the facts and circumstances that a lawyer 
must anticipate will not even have occurred yet. Lawyers help clients plan 
for future events and contingencies, such as when drafting contracts, forming 
business organizations, or conveying property. In these instances, lawyers are 
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attempting to anticipate and predict the likelihood of future events.53 That 
means hypothesizing.
Another way in which lawyers use the skill of imagining scenarios has even 
more to do with legal analysis. When events have already occurred and the 
facts about them are well known, lawyers will often hypothesize other facts to 
fully appreciate the significance of the known facts. Generating hypothetical 
scenarios to compare and contrast other situations helps lawyers holistically 
judge the matter at hand.54 It is a form of inductive reasoning that constructs 
picture-stories as metaphorical imagery, similar to reasoning by analogy.55
Illustration: Students may not recognize from hypotheticals in class how 
they might work in practice. After a student briefs a case and the professor 
has given several hypotheticals, the professor could ask, “How could 
hypothesizing like this actually help you win a case in the real world?” (Sub-
text: how could it help on the final exam.) Then the professor can propose 
yet another hypothetical: A person is charged with involuntary manslaughter 
for forcing an adult to over consume water until the person died from water 
intoxication. The person was warned by an acquaintance that over consuming 
water could lead to death. Questions for the class: “If you were the defense 
attorney, what hypothetical, relating to the warning, would you tell the jury?” 
“If you were the prosecutor, what hypothetical would you give to the jury?”
Courts will reason in this manner. Students may study a case in Torts I in 
which the court had to decide whether a captain had a privilege to secure a 
ship to the plaintiff’s dock in a storm to save the ship even though it damaged 
the dock.56 The appellate court concluded that the storm justified the ship 
captain’s use of the dock solely by hypothesizing two contrasting scenarios 
in which there would have been no such privilege: if the ship had become 
disabled on its own or the ship’s ropes had come undone from the dock on 
their own, without a storm.57 The contrasting scenarios were enough to show 
the sensibility of the court’s conclusion. The court had neatly generated 
hypothetical scenarios closely related to the actual facts. Lawyers must similarly 
possess the ability to imagine other scenarios near to the facts at hand.
Illustration: Law professors might give students an opportunity to create 
hypotheticals after discussing a brief. The professor will probably need to 
guide the classroom discussion so the hypotheticals stay on point.
53. Skemp, supra note 10, at 67 (students must be able to habitually relate concepts to concepts 
in these mental schemas in ways that predict conceivable actualities).
54. See Sullivan et al., supra note 2, at 118 (experts reason by analogy), 172 (lawyers reason by 
analogy).
55. See Holland and Webb, supra note 24, at 222 (inductive reasoning is like but richer than 
reasoning by analogy).
56. Victor E. Schwartz, Kathryn Kelly & David F. Partlett, Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Torts—
Cases and Materials 121 (Foundation Press, 11th ed. 2005) (a typical torts book which cites 
and discusses the case Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910)).
57. 124 N.W. at 222.
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IV. Logical Skills
A. Deducing
Legal reasoning is usually described as involving inductive and deductive 
processes.58 Legal analysis requires deducing conclusions from rules, 
principles, definitions, premises, facts, and other conclusions. Classically, 
deductive reasoning involves stating a major premise followed by a minor 
premise followed by a conclusion, as in A=B (major premise), B=C (minor 
premise), therefore A=C.59 Much of the reasoning shown in the other sections 
of this article is deductive because it follows this structure.60
For example, the question of whether an element has been satisfied is 
largely a question of deductive reasoning. The element’s definition is the major 
premise, the available facts are the minor premise, and articulating whether the 
element has been satisfied is the conclusion. This syllogism is centuries old; so 
it’s no wonder that IRAC, which mirrors this syllogism, makes so much sense! 
The question of whether factors weigh in the plaintiff’s or defendant’s favor 
is also deductive reasoning. The factors are the major premises, the facts, the 
minor premises, and articulating whether the factors weigh in one side’s or the 
other’s favor is the conclusion.
Deductive reasoning is closely associated with logic, comprehension, 
common sense, and order. Judges and lawyers use it because it is generally 
recognized as the most common, sound, and indispensable of the forms of 
reasoning. It may appear to be mechanical but (as other sections suggest) 
can involve such an array of different mental activities in different settings 
that it probably involves as much art as science. Far from simple, deductive 
reasoning can be difficult, complex, and highly sensitive to context, meaning, 
and objective.61
Illustration: As all sound legal arguments follow the deductive syllogism, a 
professor can help students similarly reason by pointing out in various cases 
the three parts of the syllogism.
Illustration: Professors can deepen students’ understanding of deducing 
by giving hypotheticals that test the major premise, minor premise, and 
conclusion. For example, a professor could give a fallacious major premise 
then ask, “What conclusion, if any, are we compelled to make?” or “What’s 
wrong with that legal argument, if anything?” In other words, let the students 
spot the faulty part of the syllogism.
58.  Sebastian Urbina, Legal Method and the Rule of Law 1 (Kluwer Law Intl. 2002); Holland 
& Webb, supra note 24, at 218-219; Samuel, supra note 52, at 58.
59. Samuel, supra note 52, at 120, 122; McKinney, supra note 12, at 35-36.
60. Calleros, supra note 24, at 70–71, 134 (the application of a rule to facts is a deductive reasoning 
process taking the rule as the major premise and the characterization of the facts as the 
minor premise to reach a conclusion).
61. See Samuel, supra note 52, at 129 (legal reasoning can be surprisingly complex).
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B. Inducing
Inductive reasoning is sometimes thought of as the opposite of deductive 
reasoning. In legal analysis, the two forms of reasoning, deductive and 
inductive, are important companions to one another.62
Inductive reasoning comes in two forms: analogy and inductive 
generalization.63 While those concepts may seem heady, they are processes 
that people perform everyday. In legal analysis—including the A in IRAC—
reasoning usually proceeds by analogy.64 Reasoning by analogy is nothing 
more than A is like B, so the same conclusion should attach to both. This form 
is reasoning by comparing particulars of one case to particulars of another 
case.65 Law professors can make this process explicit by pointing out when 
courts do this in the cases. In fact, the common-law doctrine of stare decisis is 
based on reasoning by analogy: if a current case is like a previously decided 
one, then the court must come to the same conclusion. With law professors 
explicitly pointing this out in class, students are probably more likely to reason 
by analogy on their exams and later in practice.
The other form of inductive reasoning—inductive generalization—requires 
lawyers to form a general rule from patterns in particular data.66 So the 
reasoning is from particular to general. In law studies, what students typically 
examine might be case materials from which they draw what they believe 
are the relevant facts explaining event. Or they might examine a collection 
of cases from which they draw what they believe to be the rule. Assembling 
the facts of a case or reading a series of cases for a rule are each inductive 
processes. Lawyers are not given only the relevant, priority information. They 
must instead assemble it.
From this description, students should see that much of what has been 
described in the sections above has depended on inductive reasoning. For 
example, to determine whether an element of a claim has been satisfied or 
whether a factor weighs in one side’s favor, a student must select and assemble 
the particular relevant facts into a general meaningful description. To define 
an element of a claim, a student might need to research, select, and read several 
cases to develop and articulate the definition. Both examples (assembling facts 
or discerning law) involve inductive processes.
One might assume that inductive processes are highly empirical and 
scientific. Certainly, reasonable minds looking at the same information for 
62. See id. at 5, 145 (“The idea that legal knowledge is to be found in the facts rather than in a rule 
is by no means new.”).
63. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers: A Guide to Clear Legal Thinking 91 (NITA, 3rd ed. 
1997).
64. See generally Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Univ. Chi. Press 1949).
65. Aldisert, supra note 63, at 89.
66. See McKinney, supra note 12, at 37 (“Inductive reasoning is the process of reaching general 
conclusions about reality based on patterns that emerge from observing separate incidents 
and occurrences over time.”).
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the same purpose might be expected to assemble similar statements. But, 
on the other hand, inductive processes readily call into play the examiner’s 
skill, experience, and perspective. Inductive processes, like developing a case 
theme or articulating disputed law in a new field of law, can be relatively more 
personal and creative than much deductive reasoning and can often draw on 
a wider variety of sources.
It would be wrong, too, to give inductive reasoning a second-class status 
to deductive reasoning. One might think that the plain logic of deductive 
reasoning is routinely regarded as superior and, for instance, more powerful in 
convincing decision-makers like judges and juries. But watch a highly skilled 
trial lawyer. Often, it is how the story is constructed and told that properly 
influences a decision. Inductive reasoning is an enormously powerful and 
valuable skill in legal analysis.
Illustration: Professors can explicitly identify inductive reasoning in class. 
Use a trigger phrase, something like “Let’s step back for a moment and look 
at the process by which the court created this rule.” One clear example of 
this for all first- or second-term students is in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.67 
in which Justice Cardozo fashioned a general manufacturer-liability rule 
from at least ten specific holdings. After a hearty discussion on the process 
a court employed to create a rule, ask how using the inductive process might 
apply in practice. Perhaps pose a hypothetical where the practitioner finds 
several somewhat similar cases but none directly on point. How might the 
practitioner in such a case employ inductive reasoning?
C. Abducing
Students must come to appreciate that a third form of reasoning (after 
deductive and inductive reasoning), known as abductive reasoning, can also 
be important to legal analysis and law practice.68
To abduce is to infer that something may exist from the existence of other 
matters that are sometimes connected with the matter inferred. Notice that 
the inference is that something may exist. Abductive reasoning is not, strictly 
speaking, a form of logic and can produce errors. Just because B follows from 
A does not mean that A is always present with B. A may be only one of several 
causes for B. Yet there are several reasons why lawyers might conjecture that 
A exists from B. Abductive reasoning is an evaluative aid toward finding an 
answer or solution.
One reason for lawyers to be good at abductive reasoning has to do with 
discovering unknown facts. The facts are not always known, even when other 
professionals (detectives, investigators, inspectors, medical-care providers) 
have completed their work. To discover all the relevant facts, lawyers must be 
67. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
68. See Holland & Webb, supra note 24, at 225-226 (abductive reasoning is a predecessor skill to 
inductive and deductive reasoning).
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able to consider what the facts might be based on, so as to reasonably request 
evidence of them.
Illustration: When discussing a boating-accident hypothetical, a professor 
could mention that the operator’s failure to observe and react caused the 
accident. Then ask, “What are some permissible inferences that would 
explain the failure to observe and react?” One obvious inference could be 
that investigating officers may not have considered whether the operator was 
intoxicated. Such an inference would lead to requesting medical records, 




Other subsidiary skills to IRAC involve evaluating arguments to determine 
the logical fitness of an assertion or premise. Evaluation has to do with making 
sound judgments, which of course is necessary to give sound legal advice.69 
Surprisingly, there are a number of subsidiary skills involved in evaluating an 
assertion.70
As has already been suggested, the skill of evaluating begins with identifying 
the assertion, argument, or premise you must evaluate. An assertion is a 
position advanced by the speaker or author of the opinion, brief, commentary, 
or other text. What is it that the author (whether a judge, opposing lawyer, law 
professor, or other commentator) is advocating, either explicitly or implicitly? 
What is the author’s thesis? It can help to think of the author’s purpose in 
writing.
After the assertion has been identified, the student or lawyer should 
question it. For example, a judge’s assertion in a judicial opinion might be 
that proof of knowledge of a substantial certainty satisfies the intent element 
for a tortious battery. Can it really? Does the opinion actually state the law of 
that jurisdiction? For another example, an opposing lawyer’s assertion might 
be that the facts of the case satisfy the intent element for a tortious battery. 
Do they? Or does opposing counsel need more facts? Lawyers are constantly 
recognizing and testing premises.
Recognizing assumptions is a way to evaluate arguments. When a student 
reads or hears an argument, the student should evaluate the validity of the 
69. See McKinney, supra note 12, at 153 (“expert law readers engage heavily in evaluating the law 
they are reading”).
70. Paul, supra note 3, at 377–378 (basic critical-thinking concepts include “assumption, fact, 
concept, value, conclusion, premise, evidence, relevant, irrelevant, consistent, inconsistent, 
implication, fallacy, argument, inference, point of view, bias, prejudice, authority, hypothesis, 
and so forth”); Johnson, supra note 38, at 77 (To reason critically, one must be able to use the 
concepts “reason, evidence, conclusion, thesis, relevant, sufficient, inconsistent, implication, 
presupposition, objection.”).
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assumptions or presuppositions behind the argument. For instance, a lawyer 
might argue that an injured child on whose behalf a tort claim has been made 
should (as a matter of law) have observed and avoided the dangerous condition 
that caused the child’s injury. What does that assertion assume? Perhaps it 
was too dark for the child to see or the child was too young to recognize the 
danger. Similarly, a court opinion might state that the defendant will be liable 
if the plaintiff proves the defendant knew of the dangerous condition before 
the plaintiff was injured by it. What does that rule assume? Perhaps there was 
nothing that the defendant could have done about the dangerous condition.
Illustration: After a robust discussion in class about a case, the professor 
could simply point out or ask about the underlying assumptions for a court’s 
holding or a student’s argument.
To evaluate a premise, argument, or assertion, the student must recognize 
the supporting evidence. That evidence may include facts, like whether a 
stoplight was red or green, or circumstances, like the relationship and roles 
of the parties. Did they know one another, or was one a supervisor of the 
other? Often, though, the important matters to consider will include rules, 
regulations, cases, policies, history, and predictions. In the most general sense, 
the evidence one can use to evaluate an assertion is as broad as one’s ability to 
connect it and the assertion.
Lawyers do not simply rely upon what they discover. Often, the matters to 
consider when evaluating an argument will be inferences drawn from other 
matters—abductive reasoning. An inference is an additional premise that can 
logically be drawn from the evidence already collected. Intent, as an element 
of a tortious battery, is a good example. There is no way to directly observe a 
person’s intent. You cannot see directly into a person’s mind for evidence of 
what the person is thinking or desires. But we all constantly infer what people 
intend by listening to their words and looking at their expressions and actions. 
Legislative intent is another good example. It is often not stated in a statute 
what the legislature intended to accomplish by enacting it. Yet in tort law, 
lawyers and judges frequently infer whether the legislature intended a statute 
to be a safety measure, so as to infer or not infer negligence from its violation.
Illustration: Evaluating an inference can be difficult. Using a visual-learning 
technique might be useful. A professor could draw on the board an archer 
some distance away from a target. The archer is the source of the facts, and the 
target’s concentric rings are the inferences. Each of the rings would represent 
an inference drawn from the facts. The bull’s-eye would be the most direct 
and thus on-point inference. As students make inferences from facts, the 
professor can ask the class to assign that inference to a ring. This will give a 
visual manifestation to an abstract discussion.
Notice how important it is to legal analysis that the student effectively judge 
what matters and what does not matter to an evaluation. Relevance is what 
lawyers call the condition of mattering. Any matter that makes a premise more 
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or less likely is a relevant matter. For example, the color of the stoplight in 
the moments before a motor-vehicle collision is likely relevant in a negligence 
tort claim. The speed of the vehicles, their direction, the observation and 
condition (inebriated or sober) of the vehicle drivers, and the condition of 
the vehicles’ brakes and taillights might also be relevant. The nationality, 
occupation, and marital status of the drivers are very probably not relevant. 
For another example, when evaluating the legislature’s intent with respect to 
whether a statute was a safety measure, the statute’s language will be relevant. 
Whether the statute was one of several other statutes, some of which are safety 
measures, may also be relevant. But whether the statute was enacted over a 
veto or publicly supported are likely irrelevant political, rather than legal, 
considerations.
Once a student has recognized the assertion or premise and then 
determined the matters relevant to its evaluation, the student must then judge 
whether those matters are consistent or inconsistent with the premise.71 They 
figuratively hold the evidence up to judge whether it supports or contradicts 
the argument. For example, testimony that the defendant made an angry face 
and uttered a threat just before shooting at the plaintiff is consistent with the 
premise (necessary to a civil-assault claim) that the defendant intended to scare 
or perhaps even hurt the plaintiff. For another example, a law requiring vehicle 
taillights is consistent with the assertion that the law is a safety measure, the 
violation of which would give rise to an inference of negligence.
Another subsidiary skill students must often exercise when evaluating an 
argument is whether the evidence supporting it is sufficient. The evidence 
may be relevant, meaning that it bears on the issue. It may be consistent, 
meaning that it tends to support the issue. But is it enough to establish the 
premise or assertion in the mind of a reasonable person? For example, post-
accident testing of a stoplight at an intersection where there was a collision 
may establish that the stoplight was working. That evidence may help the 
plaintiff’s claim that the defendant ran a red light because the stoplight was 
working. But it is insufficient to establish that the light was red rather than 
yellow or green. The claim or assertion that it was red would require eyewitness 
testimony or its equivalent for the evidence to be sufficient. Lawyers know how 
to judge sufficiency. Indeed, for a lawyer to call out “Objection!” at trial is 
(on occasion) the formal expression of the lawyer having mentally evaluated 
a premise (that there were grounds for offering the evidence) and found it 
lacking in sufficiency.
Illustration: Instead of the professor giving hypotheticals, the professor 
could give the students five or so minutes to write down several of their own. 
As a student reads his or her hypothetical, the other students could yell out 
“I object!” or “here, here!” when the evidence is sufficient or not. That would 
then lead to analyzing the sufficiency of the claim.
71. Skemp, supra note 10, at 36–37, 39 (students reality-test concepts and schemas by 
experimentation, discussion, and internal mulling for consistency).
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Another common subsidiary skill to evaluating is the ability to see 
implications. Lawyers and judges are constantly envisioning what might 
happen if certain courses are taken. The law is very much (though not 
solely) concerned with its influences, results, or effects on future events and 
actions. For example, a lawyer in a medical-malpractice case might argue that 
a local (rather than national) standard of care is most appropriate to judge 
the performance of a small-town doctor. The lawyer would reason that the 
implication of applying a national standard of care in small towns would be 
to drive small-town doctors out of practice with malpractice verdicts. Students 
must learn to watch for these kinds of instrumental cause-and-effect arguments. 
They must develop their skill at predicting the results of rulings, arguments, 
and actions, and at challenging the predictions of others.
Illustration: In a case that is particularly lacking in reasoning, ask the students 
to point out implications of the facts that each side might argue. By reasoning 
for the court, the students are learning to imply conclusions not only on final 
exams, but in practice as well.
The purpose of evaluating is to reach a justifiable conclusion. A conclusion 
is a statement that explicitly resolves the issue of whether an assertion or 
premise is consistent with sufficient evidence. To speculate on consistency, 
sufficiency, and implications without reaching a conclusion is to miss the 
point of evaluating. For example, a lawyer might preliminarily ask an accident-
reconstruction expert to explain to a jury the scientific and factual basis for 
determining the speed of a vehicle from its skid marks. But if the lawyer then 
failed to ask for the expert’s conclusion, the preliminaries would have been 
pointless. Judges, mediators, opposing counsel, and clients too, need to hear 
those conclusions. As judges are wont to say, “What’s the point, counsel?”
B. Contrasting
The prior section on hypothesizing already suggests that simply generating 
appropriate hypothetical scenarios is not enough. The skill is to usefully 
contrast the scenarios with the facts at hand—comparing and contrasting the 
imagined scenarios to the actual facts. This is the nuts and bolts of reasoning 
by analogy.
To do so, a lawyer holds in mind the actual scenario while selectively 
contrasting the generated scenarios one-by-one. Students may find it hard to 
hold the actual case facts in mind while thinking of other facts. Studies have 
shown they can improve this skill, whether in class, court, or client meetings, 
by a method some call “parking.” The student creates a short phrase or image 
of the actual case and either makes a note or drawing of it, or repeats or 
imagines it a few times until it is firmly in mind. The student may learn to do 
so while reading or hearing about a case for the first time. Doing so enables the 
student to think more freely of contrasting scenarios while retaining the ability 
to return quickly and easily to the actual case facts for contrasts.
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The skill of contrasting is selective and intentional, not random. In each 
instance, the lawyer determines whether the hypothetical scenario is closer to 
or farther away from the legal standard at issue than the actual case facts. 
Contrasting in this manner helps illustrate the legal rule or standard in a larger 
context than that which is provided solely by the case facts. Lawyers build 
a contextual field for the rule or standard to show where their case facts fit 
within it.
Illustration: A professor can give the students a real-life case to “park” in their 
mind. Then the professor can run through, or the students could suggest, 
several hypotheticals to compare to the “parked” case. For example, students 
may study a case in Torts I in which the plaintiff sued the defendant in 
negligence for having left a golf club in the yard.72 A child had accidentally 
injured the plaintiff while playing with the golf club. The case was dismissed 
because there is nothing unreasonably dangerous about leaving a golf club 
in one’s yard. That conclusion can be made more obvious by surmising other 
things that one might leave in one’s yard, some of them equally harmless 
(balls, bicycles, toys) but others unreasonably dangerous (guns, swords, 
poisons). Contrasting a golf club to, say, a knife, a chain saw, or some other 
intrinsically dangerous implement that a homeowner might negligently leave 
in a yard helps to illustrate the limits of a homeowner’s duty.
The contrast in this example lies in the characteristics of the implements in 
question. In other examples, the contrast might be in the relative knowledge and 
experience of the involved individuals, the deliberateness or reprehensibility 
of their acts, the harm or lack of harm to the victim, or the degree of risk 
associated with the conduct. Lawyers frequently contrast other scenarios to 
actual case facts both silently for their own evaluative purposes and as a means 
of advocacy and argument.
C. Scaling
Students can improve their ability to contrast hypothetical scenarios by 
scaling them along a spectrum or continuum from exaggerated contrasting 
points at either end.73 Where there is a range of possible outcomes falling 
within or outside of a legal rule, they can construct a conceptual continuum 
to help with the legal analysis, arraying the actual case facts and hypothetical 
scenarios along the continuum. For an example, consider again the case 
described above in which the allegation was made that leaving a golf club in 
one’s yard was unreasonably dangerous and therefore negligent. To illustrate 
the analysis in that case, a student might place items along a spectrum from not 
at all dangerous (a beach ball) to minimally dangerous (hard ball), nominally 
72. Schwartz et al., supra note 56, at 133 (citing this particular case, Lubitz v. Wells, 113 A.2d 147 
(1955)).
73. Sullivan et al., supra note 2, at 43 (“Legal thinking [is] the law’s ‘artificial reasoning’ about 
categorizing facts….”), 97 (“ranking and ordering, and finding logical relationships of 
including and exclusion are all basic cognitive devices”); see also Dewey, supra note 7, at 122–
123, 153 (selecting and organizing facts is critical to analytical thought).
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dangerous (baseball bat), modestly dangerous (hoe or claw), moderately 
dangerous (handsaw), quite dangerous (power tool with a cutting edge), and 
extremely dangerous (poisons and traps). Constructing the spectrum shows 
that there are several more-dangerous categories than the nominally dangerous 
category into which the golf club probably fits.
Any one case may involve several different conceptual fields. For instance, 
in the example above, one might have also made a spectrum using the people 
who could encounter the golf club, from a helpless infant, very young child, 
or blind or otherwise disabled person, to a capable older child, adult visitor, 
familiar neighbor, resident within the home, or expert golfer. The duty the 
homeowner might owe to the helpless class of persons at one end of the spectrum 
would clarify that no duty was owed the injured plaintiff who belonged at 
the capable end of the spectrum. Or one might make a spectrum out of the 
possible uses and misuses of the golf club, from accidentally stepping on it, to 
its ordinary use as a golf club, unusual use as a walking stick, balancing stick, 
garden implement, pry bar, or extraordinary use as a blunt weapon. Again, the 
duty the homeowner might owe to prevent the club’s unusual or extraordinary 
misuse makes it clearer that no duty was owed the plaintiff who was injured by 
its ordinary use.
Experienced lawyers construct and use these mental scales as an alternative 
way to evaluate and argue cases. Students, too, should reason with scaling 
by constructing an appropriate conceptual field and placing their case facts 
within it.
D. Satisfying
It has been mentioned in a section above that legal claims or charges often 
have what lawyers call “elements.” The plaintiff or prosecutor must prove or 
satisfy each element for the claim or charge to prevail. An element is satisfied 
when there is enough supportive evidence so that a reasonable person could 
conclude that the element has been satisfied. It has also been discussed above 
how elements are concepts that can be organized into schema, which are then 
fit into cognitive maps of a legal field or discipline.
To determine whether an element has been satisfied, a student must first 
understand how the element is defined. For example, the contact element 
for a tortious battery claim is satisfied by showing that the defendant caused 
some physical force to be transmitted to the plaintiff’s person or to something 
closely connected with the plaintiff’s person. The student should notice that 
there are several subsidiary ideas or criteria within the definition of contact. 
There are the ideas of causation, physical force, transmission, and personal 
or close connection with the person. Contact is not merely the defendant’s 
person touching the plaintiff’s person.
Defining an element is not the same as determining whether an element has 
been satisfied. To determine whether an element has been satisfied requires 
linking the element’s definition with the facts. It is a process of approximating, 
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figuratively putting the facts alongside the definition to see if they are sufficiently 
related so as to be within the definition. Evaluating the relationship between 
the element and facts is at the heart of the process of determining whether an 
element is satisfied.
For example, placing a water-filled bucket above a door left just ajar for 
the plaintiff’s entry would satisfy the contact element of a civil battery claim. 
The defendant would have caused a physical force to be transmitted to the 
plaintiff’s person or clothing closely connected with the plaintiff’s person. If 
the facts meet each idea or criteria within the element’s definition, then the 
element is satisfied. If the facts do not satisfy the definition, then the element 
is not satisfied.
If different inferences can be drawn, then the outcome is uncertain.  Although 
“satisfying” an “element” may sound scientific, a lawyer need not conclude 
with certainty. The art of being a lawyer is often in reaching appropriately 
qualified conclusions as to whether an element has been satisfied. A section 
below addresses quantifying these uncertainties.
E.Weighing
Not all legal rights and claims are determined by satisfying elements. In 
some instances, proving a claim or satisfying one of its elements will require 
weighing a list of factors. Students must recognize that factors are different 
from elements. Elements are conditions, each of which must be satisfied. 
Factors are various non-exclusive considerations that, by their accumulation 
or weight, tend to make the proof of a claim or element more or less likely. 
Students must recognize that not all factors must be satisfied. They may find 
evidence supporting some factors but not others. Some factors may be more 
important than others, but no one factor is necessary and no group of factors 
is exclusive of other factors.
Students must also appreciate that one factor alone, for which there 
is compelling evidence and which is particularly meaningful, may satisfy 
the element or claim that the several factors are meant to address. Or an 
accumulation of factors, as to each of which there is only weak evidence, may 
prove the element or claim.
Students will quickly appreciate that weighing factors begins with recalling 
or developing a list of factors. The students must then align case facts with 
the factors to which they relate. Weighing a factor begins with the factor’s 
statement, proceeds to equating facts as bearing weight on the factor, and ends 
with concluding which side the factor favors.
Consider, for example, the severe-distress element for the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Factors establishing severe distress may 
include (1) the source of the distress (such as embarrassment, insult, or 
risk of serious injury or death), (2) its nature (such as shock, fright, fear, or 
humiliation), (3) its manifestation (such as in sleeplessness, depression, or 
weight loss), (4) its duration, (5) whether treatment was necessary and, if so, 
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(6) what kind (counseling, medication, shock therapy), (7) what disability it 
produced (physical, mental, or work), and (8) whether there were pre-existing 
conditions. If the plaintiff’s distress lasted for one year following the incident, 
then you might conclude that the duration factor favors the plaintiff. A long 
duration is one factor that would favor satisfaction of the element of severe 
distress.
Illustration: After discussing several cases on the same subject, ask the 
students to identify three factors that a court might look at when applying 
the general rule. Incidentally, this will also give the students practice with 
inductive generalization.
F. Quantifying
Law practice is fraught with uncertainties that create other uncertainties. 
Uncertainty exists in part because critical reasoning is also inherently 
uncertain.74 Students must recognize uncertainty as important and useful.75 
Legal language is on one hand ambiguous or vague and on the other hand 
precise.76 How a lawyer qualifies conclusions to quantify law’s uncertainty will 
say a lot about the strength of the lawyer’s professional-judgment skills.
There are reasons for this vagueness. Law is thought of as solely rule-based 
when, to the contrary, it has historical and social relativity. Legal analysis 
involves more than applying rules. Vagueness and relativity create room for 
reflection, adjusting the fit and tenor of arguments, and recognizing new 
arguments, needs, and interests. Vagueness creates the opportunity if not the 
need for compromise. It leaves room to incorporate the views of others while 
expanding options and possibilities. Vagueness can be the gap through which 
a lawyer makes a client’s experience and actions real to others so that they can 
see the client’s humanity, allowing it to flourish.
While the law may be vague, students must appreciate that legal analysis—
application of law to facts—is precise. It demands that lawyers use specific 
word formulations to represent specific constructs. It does so to provide 
a level of clarity. If there were no necessary constructs (claims, charges, 
elements, and definitions), there would be nothing around which to structure 
the uncertainties. Law would be entirely relative and so less able to structure 
resolution, compromise, adjustment, and common meaning. Students 
often need to be reminded of this tension between law’s precision and its 
uncertainty. They must learn that they can be precise in their legal analysis 
while recognizing and accounting for its uncertainty.
74. See Israel Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology and 
Education 101 (Scott, Foresman and Co. 1965) (the indeterminacy of practice is “an 
ineliminable engagement of judgment in the performance”).
75. Samuel, supra note 52, at 60 (“each side uses premises which are only probable leading to 
conclusions which are only probable and which, therefore, must be supported by the further 
conditions of relevance and reasonableness”).
76. Sullivan et al., supra note 2, at 64.
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For example, although students must precisely analyze each element of a 
tort claim using its accepted definition, they might quantify the uncertainty 
of their conclusions by stating that an element was “obviously satisfied,” 
“barely satisfied,” “probably not satisfied,” or “so clearly not satisfied that no 
right-minded lawyer would maintain the claim.”77 In qualifying conclusions, 
students might point out specific aspects of the parties’ circumstances, stating, 
“In the usual case, you might conclude that no duty was owed, but consider the 
vulnerability and reliance shown by my client.” They might use probabilities 
(“unlikely,” “50/50,” “very likely,” “certain”) or providences (“fruitless,” 
“plain,” “foregone,” “inevitable”).
Quantifying uncertainty involves not only judgment but experience. 
Experienced lawyers and judges (and inexperienced lawyers who are astute 
enough to find databases, reports, and other sources for experience) use 
uncertainty to reflect their experience. Quantifying uncertainty is a key skill 
of legal analysis.
VI. Putting It Together
Critical reasoning of the type required by the IRAC method and its 
subsidiary skills has great value when employed in individual cases on 
disputed issues. When reasoning is employed by large numbers of lawyers 
within traditional professional norms for public purposes and private goals, 
it promotes stability and order in the American form of law and government. 
Reasoning requires and promotes courage, humility, curiosity, independence, 
stability, order, faith, fair-mindedness, and other attributes of a responsible 
and wise citizenry.78
This article suggests some of IRAC’s many subsidiary skills and a few 
techniques for teaching them. As law professors employ them, students will be 
able to use more of these skills with greater confidence and become reflective 
about their analytic capabilities. Early mastery of learning, whether early in a 
course or early in a career, tends to provide greater (and perhaps exponential) 
benefit.79 It is better to start ahead than to play catch-up.
Professional expertise probably takes ten years or more to master. A new 
lawyer will interact with experienced lawyers who are probably no smarter or 
harder working and who may have even forgotten much of the law they learned 
in law school. But the experienced lawyer will most likely operate with much 
more skill. New lawyers will have to hone their skill for years to come. Law 
77. See, e.g., Holland & Webb, supra note 24, at 94 (listing similar terms reflecting lawyers’ efforts 
to quantify uncertainty).
78. See Richard W. Paul, Teaching Critical Reasoning in the Strong Sense: Getting Behind 
World Views, in Critical Reasoning, supra note 4, at 152–155.
79. See Maharg, supra note 3, at 246.
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students and those who teach and mentor them should not be surprised or 
disappointed if students continue to find legal analysis challenging. Instead, 
students and those who teach and mentor them should appreciate and enjoy 
that process.
